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REWARDING EMPLOYERS' LIES: MAKING
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII
HARDER TO PROVE*
America is far better for honoring our commitment to the fundamental prin-
ciple that all are created equal, that everyone is entitled to the opportunity
to compete for jobs for which they qualify, to gain those qualifications
through education, to travel, to use public accommodations and to live wher-
ever they can afford.'
I. INTRODUCTION
While the quotation above is in keeping with the spirit of the
Civil Rights Act of 19642 - designed to eliminate employment dis-
crimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"'
- the recent Supreme Court decision in St. Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks" leaves one wondering if these goals are truly obtainable.5
The 5-4 decision, written by Justice Scalia, makes intentional dis-
crimination in the workplace more difficult to prove.6 At least one
* Special thanks to Colleen Burke, Ron Dolak, Dana Ehrens and Jeff Levine for all of their
support. I am especially appreciative to my parents, Carl and Rosann Saam, for their continued
love and guidance and for teaching me to judge a person by one thing: his character.
1. Speech by EEOC Chairman Kemp at National Press Club, Nov. 24, 1991, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 228, at DI (Nov. 25, 1992).
2. 42 USC §§ 2000(e)-2(a)(l) (1991).
3. Id.
4. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), vacated, 2 F.3d 264 (8th Cir.
1993).
5. See A Step Backward, THE ETHNIC NEWSWATCH BAY STATE BANNER, July 8, 1993, at 4
(suggesting that the principles of freedom are significantly undermined by the decision in cases
such as St. Mary's and suggesting that a majority of the Supreme Court no longer considers
racial discrimination and oppression to be serious issues). "What is most troubling about these
decisions is the court's cavalier disregard of precedent and the fanciful notion that 'race no longer
matters.' Our entire history as nation, and in the law in particular, centers on the fact that race
matters dearly." Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Finds Recent Supreme Court
Rulings Pernicious and Untenable, US. NEWSWIRE, July 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File (quoting Barbara Arnwine, the Executive Director of the Committee).
6. Linda Greenhouse, Overview of the Term; The Court's Counterrevolution Comes in Fits and
Starts, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1993, § 4, at I. But see Richard A. Samp, Intent Is Needed for
Workplace Bias, THE NAT'L L.J., June 14, 1993, at 15 (stating that the Court's decision serves to
ensure that employers will not be found liable unless that employee can prove that the employer
intentionally discriminated); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America in Support of the Petitioners, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742
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commentator has suggested that this decision is a part of a "coun-
terrevolution" by the Court resulting from the loss of Thurgood
Marshall and the appointment of Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Thomas, and Souter under Presidents Reagan and Bush.'
Whether a part of a larger counterrevolution or not, there is little
doubt that the issue of employment discrimination continues to be at
the forefront of politics. 8 At the Senate Confirmation Hearings held
in July of 1993, Senator Orrin Hatch questioned Supreme Court
nominee Ruth Ginsburg about her own employment practices.9 De-
spite having hired over fifty employees, Justice Ginsburg had not
hired any African-American applicants to serve as law clerks in the
thirteen years that she was a judge in Washington D.C. 10 It is of
little surprise to see questioning of the Justice from Congress on this
issue. Congress has often expressed its disagreement with the Court
in its interpretation of Civil Rights laws by passing legislation over-
ruling the Court's decisions." In fact, the Court's most recent deci-
sion has already come under Congressional attack. 2 Within days of
the St. Mary's decision, Senator Howard Metzenbaum sent a letter
(1993) (No. 92-602), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File (discussing the necessity of
the Supreme Court's decision so as to avoid making all "errors in managerial discretion" on the
part of the employer violative of Title VII).
7. Greenhouse, supra note 6 (describing the Court as "poised on the threshold of change"); see
also Herman Schwartz, The Court's Right Is Still Mighty, N.J. L.J., Aug. 23, 1993 at 4 (describ-
ing the Supreme Court as having a "solid conservative majority" whose "hard-shell conservativ-
ism" with at times a "more moderate variety" has dominated the Supreme Court).
8. See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing the questioning of Judge Ginsburg
during the Senate Confirmation Hearings); see also infra notes 12-14 and accoinpanying text
(noting the swift response of Congress in introducing a bill to overturn the Supreme Court's most
recent interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
9. The Senator asked if statistical evidence alone showing minority underrepresentation would
be enough to create an inference of discrimination and if the employer was therefore justified in
using quotas or other racial preferences to eliminate the imbalance. Afternoon Session of the
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, Fed. News Serv., July 20, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Legnew Library, Nominee file; see Judge Ginsburg's Employment Practices, WASH. TIMES, July
27, 1993, at F2 (criticizing Judge Ginsburg's approach to questions asked by the Senate regarding
her stance on the employment discrimination issue).
10. Judge Ginsburg's Employment Practices, supra note 9.
11. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 was intended to reverse five Supreme Court decisions ren-
dered in 1989. JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER. JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 243-44 (3d ed. 1993). This Act was vetoed by Presi-
dent Bush. Id. at 244. The Civil Rights Amendment of 1991 targeted these same five decisions.
Id.; see Susan Ritz, INTRODUCTION to THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: ITS IMPACT ON EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 9 (1992) (describing the Civil Rights Amendment of 1991 as
aiming at "restoring many of the substantive rights and analytical frameworks that were gutted
by the United States Supreme Court").
12. Sen. Metzenbaum to Push Legislation to Void Supreme Court's Bias Decision, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 129, at D-6 (July 8, 1993).
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to his colleagues asking them to join with him in sponsoring legisla-
tion to overturn the decision.13 Within weeks, two bills were intro-
duced in the House; either of which, if passed, will effectively over-
rule the Court's most recent interpretation of the Civil Rights Act.14
This Note discusses the impact of the St. Mary's decision on an
employee's ability to win Title VII suits. Section I traces the history
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and explains the various types of cases which may be brought
under the Act. Special attention is paid to the allocation of the bur-
den of proof in cases brought by employees alleging intentional dis-
crimination and the difficulty that the appellate courts had in inter-
preting the standards for the allocation as set out by the Supreme
Court prior to the St. Mary's decision.
Section II of this Note discusses the St. Mary's decision, detailing
both Justice Scalia's majority opinion as well as Justice Souter's dis-
sent. Section III analyzes Justice Scalia's majority opinion in lieu of
Federal Rule of Evidence 301 and the purpose behind the Civil
Rights Act, concentrating on the evidence needed by the plaintiff in
establishing discriminatory intent. Finally, Section IV discusses the
impact that the Court's decision will have on the number of suits
filed, the cost of litigating claims, and the eradication of discrimina-
tion in the workplace.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Types of Cases Brought Under Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 renders it unlawful for
an employer with fifteen or more employees, engaged in an industry
which affects commerce to discriminate against an individual based
on that individual's race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.1 5
13. Id.
14. H.R. 2787, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2867, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
15. The text of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991
provides in Section 703(a):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
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The statutory prohibition against discrimination also applies to em-
ployment agencies and labor organizations. 16 Title VII was the first
comprehensive federal statute to prohibit discrimination in the pri-
vate workplace. 17 Its primary purpose is "to assure equality of em-
ployment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory prac-
tices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job
environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."' In re-
sponse to the complexity of Title VII, the courts have developed two
principal doctrines to aid in its application - disparate impact and
disparate treatment.' Generally, in a disparate impact case, the
plaintiff challenges the use of a subjective or objective employment
practice which has the effect of excluding a disproportionate number
of applicants, potential applicants, or employees protected by Title
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), (2) (1991).
16. Sections 703(b)&(c) provide, inter alia, that an employment agency cannot refuse to refer
for employment any individual based on race, sex, color, religion or national origin and that a
labor organization cannot exclude from its membership based on these five characteristics. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b)(c) (1991); see, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 328 (1977) (alleging that a labor union violated Title VII "by agreeing with the em-
ployer to create and maintain a seniority system that perpetuated the effects of past racial and
ethnic discrimination").
17. FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 11, at 28 n.a (describing the Civil Rights Act of 1964
as an "omnibus" statute).
18. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). The Supreme Court noted:
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job to every person
regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not command that any person be
hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a
member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or
majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by
Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employ-
ment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or
other impermissible classification.
Id. at 800-01 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971)).
19. LEE MODJESKA. HANDLING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 3 (1980); see Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (defining the theories); see also Elizabeth
Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII United States Postal Serv. Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (1982) (comparing the disparate treatment and
disparate impact doctrines); Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination After Price
Waterhouse and Wards Cove: Semantics as Substance, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 615, 635-65 (1990)
(distinguishing the two doctrines with respect to their allocations of proof).
Supreme Court Justice Marshall wrote:
It is well established under Title VII that claims of employment discrimination be-
cause of race may arise in two different ways. An individual may allege that he has
been subject to "disparate treatment" because of his race, or that he has been the
victim of a facially neutral practice having a "disparate impact" on his racial group.
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part)
(citations omitted).
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VII.20 Disparate treatment cases, on the other hand, generally focus
on the employer's motivation; the plaintiff seeks to prove that his
employer has intentionally discriminated against him due to his sex,
race, religion, color or national origin.2
The Supreme Court has established three models of proof under
which Title VII litigation may be raised and analyzed: 2 1) the indi-
vidual disparate treatment model 23 2) a class disparate treatment
model,2  or 3) the disproportionate impact model.2  Each of these
20. FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 11, at 196. In Griggs. the Supreme Court stated that
Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); see Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (describing the use of the disparate impact
theory to subjective employment criteria).
"'[D]isparate impact' refers to a situation in which employer action, although facially neutral,
places one group at a disadvantage relative to another group." Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate
Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799, 801 (1985) (citing
Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Ad-
judication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 40 (1977)). The theory behind disparate impact cases is that
neutral practices may be used to perpetuate past discrimination. Constance B. Motley, The Su-
preme Court, Civil Rights Litigation, and Deja Vu, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 643, 651 (1991). There-
fore, if the employer cannot justify the use of the practice for business reasons, the practice should
not be used. Id. Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, there was considerable
debate over how disproportionate practices on a protected group related to discrimination. See
Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 524
(1991) (discussing the debate over "the relationship between discrimination against a protected
group and evidence that members of that group are disproportionately excluded from an opportu-
nity or benefit"). The proper use of statistics as proof of discriminatory intent in disparate treat-
ment cases has also been debated. See Julia Lamber, et al., The Relevance of Statistics to Prove
Discrimination: A Typology, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 553, 582-84 (1983) (describing the ways in which
statistics may be used in disparate treatment cases).
21. FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 11, at 93. Disparate treatment has been described as
the "most easily recognized form of discrimination." Id.; see, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting
for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107,
1111-19 (1991) (describing disparate treatment and the methods used to prove it); see also D.
Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive
Rather than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 734, 772-82 (1987) (arguing that courts should examine
an employer's motive, instead of his intent, when analyzing a disparate treatment claim).
22. FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 11, at 297. For a discussion of the Court's initial
decisions regarding the burden of proof in both disparate impact and disparate treatment claims,
see O'Neal Smalls, The Burden of Proof in Title VII Cases, 25 How. L.J. 247, 249-67 (1982).
23. For a definition of disparate treatment, see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
24. Class disparate treatment cases are also referred to as "pattern and practice" cases. FRIED-
MAN & STRICKLER. supra note 11, at 297; see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 328 (1977) (alleging that the employer had engaged in a "pattern and practice" of
employment discrimination against African-Americans and Spanish-surnamed individuals); see
also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 301 (1977) (alleging that the employer
engaged a "pattern or practice" which intentionally discriminated against a class of qualified Afri-
can-American faculty members). The difference between an individual disparate treatment claim
and a class action pattern and practice claim is at the liability stage. Cooper v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 876 (1984). In the individual's claim, the focus is on a specific hiring deci-
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models has a distinct allocation of proof - although they are not
mutually exclusive.2 6 Thus, a plaintiff is free to allege that the em-
ployer violated any or all of them. 27 As the Court's decision in St.
Mary's directly impacts the burden of proof in disparate treatment
cases, a brief historical overview of the development of the alloca-
tion of proof is necessary.
sion, whereas in the class action suit, the focus is on an established pattern of discriminatory
decision-making. Id. (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336).
25. For a definition of disparate impact, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
26. FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 11, at 297. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), the Supreme Court first acknowledged the existence of the disparate impact case. The
Court stated, "good intent or absence of discrimination does not redeem employment procedures
• ..that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability." Id. at 432. Later in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Court
affirmed the Griggs standard for the prima facie case of disparate impact, i.e., that the plaintiff
establish that a neutral practice has a disparate impact on a protected group. Id. at 425. The
Court held that the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case which proves
that the employer's policy or practice disproportionately impacts members of a protected class. Id.
(citation omitted). The burden then shifts to the employer to prove that the practice is "job re-
lated" or has a manifest relationship to his business. Id. (citation omitted). Finally, the plaintiff
must show that there are other alternatives to the employer's practice which do not have a dispro-
portionate impact, but would serve the employer's legitimate goals. Id. (citation omitted). Con-
gress actually codified this allocation of proof in Section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. This
section states in relevant part:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this
Title only if -
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is
job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or (ii)
the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) to an
alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative
employment practice.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(A) (West Supp. 1994).
With respect to class disparate treatment or pattern and practice claims, the plaintiff is initially
required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that discrimination against a protected
group was the standard operating procedure of the employer. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
431 U.S. at 336, 360. If the employee meets this standard, the burden then shifts to the employer
to rebut the inference of discrimination. Id at 360. For a discussion of the allocation of proof in
disparate treatment claims, see infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
27. FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 11, at 297; see, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 648 (1989) (alleging that the employer violated Title VII under both class
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 983 (1988) (alleging the employer violated Title VII under both disparate impact and
disparate treatment theories).
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B. The Burden of Proof for Private Non-Class Disparate
Treatment Cases
1. McDonnell Douglas and its Progeny
The Supreme Court first confronted intentional discrimination,
following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in the case of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green." In McDonnell Douglas, an
African-American mechanic had been laid off as part of the general
reduction in the employer's work force." The employee alleged that
both this action and the employer's general hiring practices were
racially motivated.30 As part of his protest to these actions, the
mechanic participated in a "stall-in" in which he and other mem-
bers of a Civil Rights group intentionally stalled their cars on the
main roads to the employer's plant, effectively blocking all access
during the morning shift change.31 Shortly after the "stall-in," the
employer publicly advertised for qualified mechanics and Green ap-
plied for rehire.32 The employer stated that he refused to hire Green
because of his involvement in the "stall-in. 3 3 Green then filed suit
alleging that the employer had failed to rehire him both because of
his race and because of his participation in civil rights activities in
violation of §§ 703(a)(1) 84 and 704(a) 5 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 6
In its opinion, the Court held that in a Title VII case, the em-
ployee must carry the initial burden of persuasion by establishing a
prima facie case of racial discrimination. 7 The Court said a prima
facie case "may"38 be established if the employee establishes:
28. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
29. Id. at 794.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 796.
33. The employer also alleged that Green participated in another separate illegal incident. Dur-
ing this incident, a padlock was placed on the employer's front door thus preventing certain em-
ployees from leaving. Although Green knew of the incident before it transpired, the extent of his
involvement was unclear. Id. at 795.
34. For the text of Section 703(a)(1), see supra note 15.
35. Section 704 provides that, "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment ...because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a) (1991).
36. McDonnell Douglas. 411 U.S. at 796.
37. Id. at 802.
38. The Court specifically noted that the elements of the test may vary according to the factual
situation. Id. at 802 n. 13. For a discussion of the various adaptations of the prima facie case in
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(i) that he [is a member of a protected class]; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
[with similar] qualifications.89
After the employee has established a prima facie case, the burden
then shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee's rejection. °4 0  Finally, the
Court recognized that the employee must be given a "fair opportu-
nity" to show the employer's reason was in fact a pretext for unlaw-
ful discrimination.4 1 The Court remanded the case to the lower
court to give the employee the opportunity to show that the em-
ployer's stated reason for the employee's rejection was a pretext.4
The Court stated that, "[e]specially relevant to such a showing
would be evidence that white employees involved in acts against pe-
titioner [employer] of comparable seriousness to the 'stall-in' were
nevertheless retained or rehired. 143 The Court also suggested that
other evidence such as the way the employer had treated the em-
ployee while he was employed, if the employer had any reactions to
the employee's participation in legitimate civil rights activities, and
the employer's "general policy and practice with respect to minority
employment" may be relevant to showing pretext. The Court
found that statistics could be helpful to determine "whether [the
employer's] refusal to rehire respondent [employee] . . . conformed
to a general pattern of discrimination against blacks."48
different factual scenarios, see Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical Proof of Discrimination: Beyond
"Damned Lies," 68 WASH. L. REv. 477, 513 n.121 (1993). Not only have the elements of this test
been adapted to accommodate the factual situations of other Title VII cases, the test has also been
used to establish prima facie cases under a variety of other federal statutes with prohibitions
against discrimination. See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The
Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 59,
62 n.14 (1991) (noting that the four elements of the prima facie case have been applied in cases
alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Employee Retirement Invest-
ment Security Act, and Civil Rights Act of 1866).
39. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 804.
42. Id. The Supreme Court has used this type of allocation of proof in other contexts. See e.g.,
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (establishing a similar allocation of proof in the process
of jury selection). For a discussion of the similarities between the allocation of proof in jury selec-
tion and employment discrimination cases, see infra notes 311-14.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 804-05.
45. Id.
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This first attempt to clarify the allocation of the burden of proof
left many questions unresolved., 6 Specifically, the Court's require-
ment that after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the bur-
den must shift to the employer to "articulate" some legitimate rea-
son for its action.4 Disagreement arose among the lower courts as
to the precise nature of the employer's burden. Some courts held
that the employer need only to produce evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason;4 9 while others held that after a prima fa-
cie case is established, the burden of persuasion shifts to the em-
ployer who therefore had to prove by a preponderance of evidence
the existence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.50
In two decisions in 1978, the Court failed to resolve the dispute
regarding the allocation of the burden at the second stage. 1 In
Furnco Construction Corporation v. Waters,52 the Court held that
under McDonnell Douglas,
it is apparent that the burden which shifts to the [defendant] is merely that
of proving that he based his . . . decision on a legitimate consideration
.... To dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie [case] under Mc-
Donnell Douglas, the [defendant] need only 'articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason' [for the action taken]."
In a decision rendered a few months later, the Court acknowledged
that its use of the words "prove" and "articulate" in describing the
employer's burden in Furnco confused the issue." In its decision in
46. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 11, at 99-100 (describing the confusion which
resulted in the lower courts as a result of this decision over issues such as the kind of prima facie
showing a plaintiff must present to be considered "qualified").
47. Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory
of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1237 (1981).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Barnes v. St. Catherine's Hosp., 563 F.2d 324, 329 (7th Cir. 1977) (stating "[w]e
think it sufficient to note that the hospital [employer] introduced competent evidence tending to
prove that Mrs. Barnes [employee] was terminated because of her insubordination [a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason]"); Sabol v. Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009, 1012 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding that
once the prima facie case is established, it "is incumbent on the defendant to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the defendant's action).
50. Belton, supra note 47 (discussing the difference between the "articulate" and "prove"
methods of the court); see, e.g., Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir.
1977) (adopting the view that the employer bears the burden of proving the legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reasons for his actions by a preponderance of the evidence in Title VII actions).
51. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Board of Trustees of Keene State
College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
52. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
53. Id. at 577-78 (citation omitted).
54. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 439 U.S. at 25 (discussing the confusion sur-
rounding the Court's use of both of the words "proof' and "articulate" as defining the defendant's
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Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,55 the Court
made a final attempt at clarifying the precise burden at the second
stage of the triumvirate formula established in McDonnell
Douglas.56
2. The Burdine Decision and Its Progeny
In Burdine, the plaintiff, a female employee, filed suit against her
employer alleging that the employer's failure to promote her and its
decision to terminate her were based on gender considerations. 5
The plaintiff worked as a Field Services Coordinator in the Public
Services Careers Division ("PSC") of the Texas Department of
Community Affairs ("TDCA").5 8 Shortly after her supervisor re-
signed in November of 1972, the plaintiff applied for the position of
project director.5 9 Six months later, at the request of the United
States Department of Labor, TDCA hired a project director.60 De-
spite the fact that the plaintiff had maintained her application for
the position, the TDCA hired a male employee from another divi-
sion for the position.61 As part of a reduction in staff, the plaintiff
and two others were terminated.62
The district court found that neither the employer's failure to pro-
mote nor its decision to fire the plaintiff was based on gender. 6 The
employer stated that the decision not to promote the plaintiff was
based on the nondiscriminatory assessment of each candidate's rele-
vant qualifications and that the decision to fire was based on a find-
ing that the three individuals who were terminated did not work
well together.64 The district court held that the reasons were ra-
burden in Furnco).
55. 450 U.S. 248 (1980).
56. For a discussion of the evidentiary triumvirate as articulated by the Court in McDonnell
Douglas, see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
57. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 251.
58. Id. at 250.
59. Id.
60. PSC was being funded completely by the Department of Labor. Id. The director of PSC
was informed by the Department of Labor of its decision to terminate the division. Id. PSC con-
vinced the Department to allow it to continue operating if it made some changes including the
appointment of a permanent project director and complete staff re-organization. Id.
61. Id. at 250-51.
62. Id. at 251.
63. Id.
64. Id. The employer stated that TDCA believed that firing the three individuals would im-
prove the division's efficiency. Id.
[Vol. 44:673
REWARDING EMPLOYERS' LIES
tional and did not evidence a discriminatory motive.65
The appellate court affirmed in part, finding that the district
court's "implicit evidentiary finding" that the man hired as project
director was better qualified for the position was not clearly errone-
ous, and that the plaintiff was therefore not discriminated against
when the employer failed to promote her. 66 However, the appellate
court found that the employer had failed to sufficiently rebut the
employee's prima facie case of gender discrimination in the em-
ployer's decision to terminate her employment.67 The appellate court
held that the employer "bears the burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence" that nondiscriminatory reasons for the de-
cision exist and must "prove by objective evidence that those hired
or promoted were better qualified than the plaintiff."66 The Su-
preme Court reversed.69
In defining the allocation of the evidentiary burdens, the Court
stated that establishing a prima facie case creates a presumption
that the employer unlawfully discriminated.7 0 The burden must then
shift to the employer to rebut this presumption by raising a genuine
issue of fact.7 1 "To accomplish this, the defendant [employer] must
clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence,
the reasons for the [employee's] rejection. 17 2 However, the employer
"need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the
proffered reasons."'7 3 The Court went on to find that if the employer
failed to offer any reason for his action, the employee would be enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law as no genuine issue of fact
would be created.74 Once the employer's burden had been satisfied,
however, "the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specific-
ity.17 5 The burden "frame[s] the factual issue with sufficient clar-
ity," to allow the employee to demonstrate pretext. 76 At the pretext
stage, the employee must demonstrate that "the proffered reason
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 250-52.
68. Id. at 252. The appellate court remanded the case in order for backpay to be computed. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 252-53.
71. Id. at 253.
72. Id. at 255.
73. Id. at 254.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 255.
76. Id. at 255-56.
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was not the true reason for the employment decision;" a burden
which "merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court
that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination."" The
employee may do this "either directly by persuading the court that
a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indi-
rectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is un-
worthy of credence. 78
Prior to Burdine, the focus of the disagreement among lower
courts revolved around the employer's burden at the second stage.7 9
After Burdine, the focus shifted to the nature of the proof as a
whole." In United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aik-
ens,81 the plaintiff, an African-American employee, filed a disparate
treatment claim alleging that the United States Postal Service had
discriminated against him by refusing to promote him on account of
his race. 82 The employer argued that the employee had failed to es-
tablish a prima facie case.8" The Supreme Court dismissed this is-
sue,8' finding instead that the real inquiry revolved around the find-
ing of the ultimate fact in the case: whether "'the defendant
[employer] intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff [em-
ployee].' "85 The Court noted that an employee may prove his case
either by direct or circumstantial evidence and that the trier of fact
should consider all the evidence before it and attach to it whatever
weight it may deserve.86 "All courts have recognized that the ques-
tion facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and
difficult. . . . There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the
employer's mental processes .... The law [however] often obliges
77. Id. at 256.
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion that the appellate
courts had over the defendant's burden at the second stage).
80. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's instruction
to the lower court to consider the evidence as a whole in determining the existence of a discrimi-
natory intent).
81. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
82. Id. at 712.
83. Id. at 713.
84. The Court stated that "[w]here the defendant has done everything that would be required
of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so
is no longer relevant." Id. at 715; see Bartholet, supra note 19 (discussing the ramifications of the
decision had it been based on the prima facie case).
85. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
86. Id. at 714 n.3.
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finders of fact to inquire into a person's state of mind."87 The Court
then remanded the case to the district court for it to determine,
based on all the evidence, whether the employer had intentionally
discriminated against the employee.8 8 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the employee retains the bur-
den of proving pretext at the third stage.8 9 Citing Burdine,90 Justice
Blackmun noted that the burden may be met by the employee either
by persuading the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer's decision was motivated by discrimination or by showing
"'that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.' "91 Thus, after the decisions in Burdine and Aikens, it
appeared that an employee would be able to prove intentional dis-
crimination, even absent direct evidence proving such intent.92 How-
ever, the appellate courts disagreed as to the proper application of
the principles pronounced by the court and these decisions were not
interpreted uniformly among the circuits.93
3. Interpreting the Decisions - the Plaintiffs Burden at the
Third Stage
Despite the language and opinions in both Burdine and Aikens
suggesting that the plaintiff may proceed in the third stage by either
direct or indirect proof, courts of appeals have interpreted these de-
cisions differently. 4 After Burdine, many courts held that a plaintiff
could prove pretext, and thus intentional discrimination, by showing
that the employer's articulated reasons for the adverse employment
decision are untrue.95 Under this rule, which is known as the "pre-
text-only" rule, the plaintiff does not need to produce any additional
evidence of discriminatory animus, as "the court may infer discrimi-
natory intent from the fact that the defendant lied about its motiva-
tions." 96 A minority of the courts have adhered to what is known as
87. Id. at 716.
88. Id. at 717.
89. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
90. Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
91. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
92. See supra notes 86-92 (authorizing the use of circumstantial evidence to show the discrimi-
natory intent of the employer).
93. See, e.g., Lanctot, supra note 38, at 65-68 (discussing the difference between pretext and
pretext-plus circuits).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 65.
96. Id.
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the "pretext-plus" rule." Under this rule, the fact that the plaintiff
has shown that the employer's reasons are untrue is not enough.98
Instead, "the plaintiff must produce some additional evidence to
show not only that the employer has concealed some other reason by
its pretextual explanation, but also that the reason concealed by the
employer was intentional discrimination."99 To complicate matters,
jurisdictions are not always consistent in applying their rule of
choice and thus "both the 'pretext-only' and the 'pretext-plus' rules
seem to exist side by side." 100
a. Pretext-only decisions: examples from two circuits01
In its decision in Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc.,102 the Eighth
Circuit specifically stated that "Burdine clearly does not support a
pretext-plus approach."10 3 In Williams, a fifty-one year old African-
American man alleged that his employer had discriminated against
him on the basis of race and age in terminating his employment and
replacing him with a thirty year old man.' 04 On appeal, the em-
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 66 (emphasis in original).
100. Id. at 67, 72-73 nn.48-49, & 85-86 nn.96-97 (addressing the fact that courts often seem to
use either pretext-plus theory in one case, requiring the plaintiff to come forward with additional
evidence, then in the next case follow a pretext-only theory). The First Circuit, for example, ap-
pears to have changed its mind from following a pretext-plus approach to one of pretext-only. In
its decision in Olivera v. Nestle Puerto Rico, Inc., 922 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1990), the First Circuit
held, "a plaintiff has the burden not only of proving that the articulated reasons of the employer
were pretextual but also of adducing additional evidence that the articulated reasons were a pre-
text for age discrimination." Id. at 48. However, recently in Cuello-Suarez v. Puerto Rico Elect.
Power Auth., 988 F.2d 275 (Ist Cir. 1993) the court expressly rejected its decision in Olivera as
the law of the circuit and stated, "there is no absolute rule that a plaintiff must adduce additional
evidence." Id. at 280, 280 n.6.
101. In addition to the Eighth and Third Circuits, other jurisdictions appear to apply the pre-
text-only standard. See, e.g., Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding that in order to prevail the plaintiff does not necessarily have to offer any evidence be-
yond that of a prima facie case, as this evidence alone may suffice to determine that the defend-
ant's explanation is pretextual), amended, 784 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1986); Thornbrough v. Colum-
bus & Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 647 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that the plaintiff need not
prove the employer "was motivated by bad reasons; he need only to persuade the factfinder that
the [employer's] purported good reasons were untrue."); Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311,
1317 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding that an employer cannot prevail on a justification that is first
articulated by the judiciary in the district court; the factual issues in question are relegated to
determining if the employer's reasons are "specious"); see also Lanctot, supra note 38, at 71-81
(discussing various pretext-only decisions).
102. 964 F.2d 723 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 635 (1992). For a further discussion of
Williams, see infra notes 292-306 and accompanying text.
103. Williams, 964 F.2d at 728.
104. Id. at 725-26.
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ployer asserted that the magistrate erred in failing to enter a judg-
ment not withstanding the verdict because there was no evidence of
pretext or intentional age discrimination. 10 5 The court held that it
was proper to apply the three stage order of proof outlined in Mc-
Donnell Douglas to an age discrimination case."" The employer ar-
gued, however, that the plaintiff's burden at the third stage goes
beyond that of proving that the employer's reasons were pretex-
tual.10 7 The employer argued that the plaintiff must also prove that
age was a determining factor in the employer's decision to fire
him.'08 In rejecting the employer's contention, the court, quoting its
decision in MacDissi v. Valmont Industries, Inc.,' 0 stated that an
"'employer's submission of a discredited explanation for firing a
member of a protected class is itself evidence which may persuade
the finder of fact that such unlawful discrimination actually oc-
curred.' ""o The court recognized that this approach was inconsis-
tent with the pretext-plus approach"' and acknowledged that their
105. Id. at 726.
106. Id. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 USC § 621-34 (1990), "broadly pro-
hibits discrimination in the workplace based on age," Lorilliard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577
(1978), and is the exclusive federal remedy for age discrimination in the workplace. FRIEDMAN &
STRICKLER, supra note 11, at 913. Section 623 (a)(l) of the Act provides: "It shall be unlawful
for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(l) (1990). The Act, however,
is limited to discrimination against those 40 year and older. FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note
11, at 916.
Both the substantive text of the ADEA and its coverage are virtually identical to that of Title
VII. FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 11, at 914-15. In fact, the Supreme Court has noted
that the "prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII," Lorilliard, 434
U.S. at 584, and has found it it proper to apply Title VII jurisprudence where it is analagous to
claims under the ADEA. FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 11, at 926. Thus, courts have
found that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to age discrimination cases which rely on
indirect evidence of discrimination. See, e.g., Summers v. Communication Channels, Inc., 729 F.
Supp. 1234 (N.D. Ill. 1990); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121
(1985) (noting that the McDonnell Douglas test may not apply where there is direct evidence of
discrimination and thus was not useful in the factual scenario presented in the case); Lanctot,
supra note 39, at 62 n.14 (noting that the four elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case have been applied to cases involving allegations of age discrimination). The McDonnell
Douglas formulation, however, cannot always be strictly applied in an age discrimination case.
See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 11, at 928-29 (citing examples of cases in which the
court has had to modify the McDonnell Douglas test to allow an employee to establish a prima
facie case).
107. Williams, 964 F.2d at 728.
108. Id. at 727.
109. 856 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1988).
110. Williams, 964 F.2d at 728 (quoting MacDissi, 856 F.2d at 1059).
111. Id. The court cited Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 (5th Cir.
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own decision in Gray v. University of Arkansas112 had in fact hinted
at the pretext-plus approach." 3
In Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 4 the Third Circuit, in an en
banc decision, reversed the lower court's grant of summary judg-
ment for the defendant-employer. 1 5 The plaintiff sought to prove
that he was wrongfully terminated as a result of his age."' In grant-
ing summary judgment, the lower court held that the plaintiff would
be unable to prove pretext absent some direct evidence of discrimi-
natory intent.1 7 It noted:
Nothing the plaintiff had proffered raises an issue of age as a factor that
was considered along with the other intangibles. No statements made to
plaintiff, no memos among defendant's decision-making employees have
been submitted; no statistics have been compiled; no pattern or practice of
discrimination has been suggested. To allow a jury to infer age discrimina-
tion would simply be to invite speculation. 1 8
The appellate court reversed, finding that the district court erred in
requiring the employee to show direct evidence that his age was a
determinative factor in his termination." 9 The court held that the
proper standard allows the employee to "prevail by means of indi-
rect proof that the employer's reasons are pretextual without
presenting evidence specifically relating to age."' 20 Thus, in order
for a court to grant summary judgment to an employer, the em-
ployer must demonstrate that the employee cannot present either
direct evidence of a discriminatory intent, or indirect evidence of
such intent by showing that the articulated reasons are subject to
factual dispute.' 2' The court went on to state that an employer who
"is less than honest in proffering its reason for discharge risks an
unnecessary age discrimination verdict. ' ' 122
In a more recent decision, the Third Circuit reiterated its Chipol-
1988), and White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933
(1984), as examples of advocating the pretext-plus approach.
112. 883 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 1989).
113. Id. at 1402.
114. 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 26 (1987).
115. Id. at 895.
116. Id. at 894.
117. Id. at 896.
118. Id. at 898 (quoting Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 1156 (D.N.J. 1985)).
119. Id. at 901-02.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 899.
122. Id.
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lini holding in Josey v. John R. Hollilngsworth Corp.'23 In Josey,
the plaintiff sought to prove that his former employer had dis-
charged him because of his race. 24 The lower court granted sum-
mary judgment for the employer finding that the employee had
failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to pretext for his dismis-
sal. 2 5 The appellate court reversed and noted that while the district
court was entitled to accept the employer's reason of the necessity of
a reduction in the work force as meeting his burden at the second
stage, this reason could not be used as a veil to discriminate. 6 The
Third Circuit found that there were inconsistencies in the em-
ployer's explanation which could lead a factfinder to find that the
stated reasons were pretextual and render a verdict for the
employee. 27
Where direct smoking gun evidence of discrimination is unavailable, this
court has found that the proper inquiry is 'whether evidence of inconsisten-
cies and implausibilities in the employer's proffered reasons for discharge
reasonably could support an inference that the employer did not act for non-
discriminatory reasons, not whether the evidence necessarily leads to the
conclusion that the employer did act for discriminatory reasons.' 1 8
By strictly adhering to the language of the Supreme Court in de-
cisions such as Burdine and Aikens, pretext-only circuits were able
to justify a finding for the employee, even when the employee lacked
direct evidence of an intent to discriminate.'2 9 Pretext-plus jurisdic-
tions, however, rejected this notion. 30 These jurisdictions hold that
proof that the employer's proffered reasons for their action were not
credible is insufficient to prove intentional discrimination. 3'
123. 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Chippolini, 814 F.2d at 900).
124. Id. at 635. The plaintiff, an African-American man, began working for his employer in
1976, moved to a supervisory position in 1978 and eventually became Assistant Manager of Qual-
ity Assurance in 1987. Id. The company had been sold to 13 white employees in 1982. Id. Neither
the plaintiff nor the 13 other employees who had been employed longer than him were given the
option to purchase shares. Id. Upon hearing that the current Manager of Quality Assurance
planned to retire, the plaintiff became interested in the position and began training for it. Id. The
current manager refused to train him and prior to the plaintiff's promotion remarked "that one's
job could not be significant if it could be filled by a black person." Id. Other employees com-
mented to plaintiff that they believed he was promoted on account of his race and the plaintiff
found anonymous notes in his office containing various racial slurs. Id.
125. Id. at 636.
126. Id. at 639-40.
127. Id. at 640.
128. Id. at 638 (quoting Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 900 (3d Cir. 1986)).
129. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (discussing the pretext-only rule).
130. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing the pretext-plus rule).
131. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (stating that pretext-plus courts require the
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b. Pretext-plus decisions: examples from two circuits 13 2
In Clark v. Huntsville City Board of Education, the Eleventh
Circuit appeared to apply the pretext-plus standard in denying the
plaintiff recovery in a race discrimination case.1"" The plaintiff, an
African-American principal working within the school system, was
passed over for the job of director of vocational education.13 4 The
school filled the position with a white male who had not previously
been employed by the school system. 3 5 The employer's articulated
reason was that the man hired was better qualified.3 6 Thus, accord-
ing to the employer, the school board's policy of giving first consid-
eration to qualified intra-system employees was not applicable as it
only applied to employment decisions in which the candidates had
tied. 37
The lower court found for the employee, stating that the school's
refusal to adhere to the policy by considering the outside candidate's
greater qualifications was a pretext for intentional discrimination. 38
The appellate court reversed, holding that while the court could con-
sider the failure to adhere to the written policy as evidence of pre-
text, the court could not "leap directly from its interpretation of the
policies to a conclusion of intentional discrimination." 3 9 The appel-
late court concluded:
[t]he [district] court thus may not circumvent the intent requirement of the
plaintiff to do more than simply show that the employer's reasons are untrue to prevail in a dis-
crimination claim).
132. For a discussion of other pretext-plus decisions, see Lanctot, supra note 38, at 81-91.
While on the District Court for the District of Columbia, Justice Antonin Scalia, wrote a stern
dissent in Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984), later proceeding, 35
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34899 (D.D.C. 1984), which advocated the pretext-plus approach. Id. at
1239 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Carter, the plaintiff, the only African-American in a small firm
presented evidence that she was routinely treated differently from white employees, her pay had
remained at the low end of the employer's pay scale and had presented evidence of a racist joke
told by a supervisor. Id. at 1227-29. In his dissent, Justice Scalia stated, "[e]ven if a plausible
showing of discriminatory treatment had been made, however, in order to get to the jury the
plaintiff would still have to introduce some evidence that would enable a reasonable person to
conclude that the basis for this discriminatory treatment was race." Id. at 1245 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). For a further discussion of the Carter case, see infra notes 275-82 and accompanying
text.
133. 717 F.2d 525 (11th Cir. 1983).
134. Id. at 526.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 527.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 528.
139. Id.
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plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuasion by couching its conclusion in terms
of pretext; a simple finding that the defendant did not truly rely on its prof-
fered reason, without a further finding that the defendant relied instead on
race, will not suffice to establish Title VII liability."
40
Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has applied the
pretext- plus approach in employment discrimination cases. In La
Montagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc.,"' the Seventh
Circuit held that the employee had failed to prove that age was a
determining factor in the employer's decision to terminate his em-
ployment.142 The employer stated that the employee was fired be-
cause he had communication problems with his supervisor and had
caused some divisiveness within his department. 4 s The employee of-
fered evidence showing that he had performed his job satisfacto-
rily. 1 44 The court held that this evidence was not enough. 146 It stated
that while the employee need not prove that age discrimination was
the only factor motivating his discharge, he must prove that it was a
determining factor among others:146 "Thus we must also ask
whether the evidence of age discrimination is sufficiently substantial
to show that in addition to the [employer's] proffered reasons [the
employee's] age was a factor, and indeed a determining factor, in
his discharge. '47 Given that the federal circuits had two vastly dif-
ferent approaches in applying the same federal statute, it seemed
only a matter of time before the Supreme Court would address the
allocation of proof issue again.
III. SUBJECT OPINION: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks."8
A. Facts
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve the conflict surrounding
the appropriate burden of proof in its decision in St. Mary's.149 The
plaintiff in the case was an African-American correctional officer
employed by St. Mary's, a halfway house operated by the Missouri
140. Id. at 529.
141. 750 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1984).
142. Id. at 1414.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), vacated, 2 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1993).
149. Id.
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Department of Corrections and Human Resources. 150 The plaintiff
was hired in August, 1978 and was promoted to one of six supervi-
sory positions in February, 1980.15 Prior to 1984, he had a satisfac-
tory employment record.1 52 In 1984, following an investigation into
the administration of the halfway house, John Powell became the
new chief of custody and the plaintiff's immediate supervisor.1 53
Subsequently, the plaintiff's job performance began to fail. He was
suspended for five days as a result of institutional rules violations15 4
and reprimanded for his alleged failure to investigate a fight which
had occurred while he was supervising a shift.1 55 When he failed to
make sure that his subordinates properly logged their use of a St.
Mary's vehicle in the record book, the plaintiff was demoted from
his supervisory position to that of correctional officer. 56 He was
eventually fired for threatening Powell during an argument.15 7 He
then filed suit against his employer claiming that the employer had
violated Title VII by demoting and terminating him because of his
race.15 8
150. Id. at 2746.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. The alleged violation of institutional rules occurred when two transportation officers
could not get into St. Mary's front door during the plaintiff's shift. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor
Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd & remanded, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992),
cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 954 (1993), rev'd & remanded, 113 S. Ct 2742 (1993), vacated, 2 F.3d
264 (8th Cir. 1993). The control center officer had to leave his post to let the officers in the front
door. Id. Upon entering the building, the two found that the lights in the first floor were off and
that another officer was not present at his post. Id. They filed a report with Powell. Id. A four
person disciplinary board, composed of two whites and two African-Americans recommended that
plaintiff be suspended for five days. Id. at 1246-47. The superintendent recommended the same to
the director and the director suspended the plaintiff. Id. at 1247.
155. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2746. The plaintiff drafted a memo to John Powell informing
him of the fight between the two inmates and ordered another guard to submit a report. Hicks,
756 F. Supp. at 1247. John Powell submitted a report to Steve Long because the plaintiff failed to
investigate "the seriousness of the assault or the after effects on the residents involved." Id.
156. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1247. The institution's rules required that each use of the vehicles
be recorded in the log. Id. As a result of this, a four person disciplinary board of two whites and
two African-Americans voted to demote the plaintiff. Id. The board's recommendation was imple-
mented. Id.
157. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2746. The argument occurred following a meeting the plaintiff
had with Powell, Long, and another supervisor in which they told him that he was being demoted.
Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1247. Powell followed the plaintiff out of the meeting and asked him to go
to his locker so that Powell could get the plaintiff's supervisory manual. Id. A four-member disci-
plinary panel voted to suspend plaintiff for three days, but Long recommended termination. Id. at
1247-48. The director terminated the plaintiff. Id. at 1248.
158. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2746.
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B. Procedural History
The district court held that the employee had established a prima
facie case and that his employer had proffered two legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for its actions: the severity of the plaintiff's
violations and the number of violations. 159 The court further found
that the plaintiff had proved pretext by showing that he and not any
of the subordinates had been disciplined for incidents which gave
rise to institutional violations and that a shift supervisor had not
been disciplined in similar circumstances. 160 The plaintiff also sub-
mitted evidence showing that a supervisor had not been disciplined
for violations of a more serious nature. 6 ' The court found that
while the plaintiff proved pretext, his burden of proving intentional
discrimination had not been met because he had "not proven that
the crusade [against him] was racially rather than personally moti-
vated." '162 Because the court found that the plaintiff had failed to
prove that his unfair treatment was motivated by his race, it granted
judgment in favor of the employer.'63
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court's deci-
sion.1 64 The appellate court found that the lower court erred in as-
suming that the employer's actions were motivated by personal rea-
159. Id. at 2747.
160. Id. at 2748. The plaintiff established, for example, that on two separate occasions during a
supervisor's shift the front door officer was not present and that the control center officer had to
leave his post to open the door. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1250-51. During another shift under the
same supervisor, the doors to the main power room were left open and "[a]n inmate who had
access to [this room] could [have] turn[ed] off the electricity and disable[d] the security system."
Id. at 1251. At no time was the shift supervisor disciplined for these incidents. Id.
161. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1251. An inmate escaped during one supervisor's shift. Id. Al-
though the supervisor admitted the escape occurred as a result of his negligent failure to carry out
an order, he was not disciplined. Id.
162. Id. at 1252. The plaintiff attempted to show that St. Mary's had disproportionately fired
African-Americans in 1984. The court dismissed this as direct evidence finding that the number of
African-Americans had remained consistent throughout 1984. Id. Furthermore, the court held
that it was "not unusual" that as a result of the personnel changes in 1984, several African-
Americans were replaced by whites as almost all of the supervisory positions prior to 1984 were
held by blacks. Id. As a factor in weighing the employer's intent, the court also considered that
there were at least two blacks on each of the disciplinary review boards. Id. The plaintiff also
introduced a study conducted before his termination which claimed that blacks had too much
power at St. Mary's. Id. The court discredited this evidence as both Long and Powell claimed that
they were not aware of the study until after they had already made the decision to terminate the
plaintiff. Id.
163. Id.
164. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 488 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 954 (1993), rev'd & remanded, 113 S. Ct 2742 (1993), vacated, 2 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1993).
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sons because this was not a reason articulated by the employer. 165
The appellate court reasoned that once the employer articulated the
two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his actions and both
were discredited as pretexts by a preponderance of the evidence, the
employee had met the ultimate burden of persuasion and was enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.1"
C. The Supreme Court's Opinion
1. The Majority Opinion
In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court
reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision. 1 7 The Court first focused
upon the presumption of discrimination created by the prima facie
case. It stated that the establishment of the presumption by the
prima facie case "produces a required conclusion in the absence of
explanation" that the employer had discriminated .1 8 This presump-
tion then places the burden upon the employer to produce an expla-
nation rebutting the prima facie case.1 9 The Court noted, however,
that once the employer has produced evidence of nondiscriminatory
reasons, regardless of whether they are ultimately persuasive or not,
he has sustained his burden. This places the employer in a better
position than if he were to remain silent at the second stage.17 0 The
Court stated that the trial court is then in the position to decide the
ultimate question of fact - whether the employer intentionally dis-
criminated against his employee.17 1 The Court noted that disbelief
of the employer's proffered reasons especially when accompanied by
a suspicion of mendacity, along with the proof of the prima facie
case could be enough to prove discrimination.1 7 The Court found
165. Id. at 492. The court had reservations about whether personal motivations could actually
ever be considered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Id. Accordingly, the court chose not to
address personal motivations as the defendant had not presented it as a reason. Id.
166. Id. at 492-93.
167. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993), vacated. 2 F.3d 264 (8th
Cir. 1993).
168. Id. (citing I DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 67, 536 (1977)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2748. As the establishment of the prima facie case creates a presumption that the
employer discriminated, then remaining silent would result in judgment for the plaintiff. Id. at
2747 (citing LOuISELL & MUELLER, supra note 168, at §§ 67, 536).
171. Id. at 2749.
172. Id. Justice Scalia stated that, "rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will permit
the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination." Id. (emphasis in original).
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however, that the appellate court's holding that the rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff.173
The holding "disregards the fundamental principle of Rule 301 that
a presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our
repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears
the ultimate burden of persuasion." 174
Justice Scalia presented a hypothetical case in support of his ar-
gument. 17 5 In the hypothetical, the employer has a forty percent mi-
nority work force with minorities consisting of only ten percent of
the relevant labor market.1 76 A minimally qualified minority appli-
cant is rejected. 77 The company's hiring officer who made the deci-
sion is also a member of the applicant's minority group.17 8 Subse-
quently, the applicant files suit, but before trial, the hiring officer is
fired.17 9 Justice Scalia proposed that under the dissent's interpreta-
tion of the law which allows the plaintiff to prove his case indirectly,
the statistical evidence of a disproportionate minority makeup would
be irrelevant as would the fact that the hiring officer was a member
of the same minority group. 80 Justice Scalia stated that under the
dissent's approach the employer would be forced to articulate some
rational explanation for its refusal to hire, relying on the "now an-
tagonistic former employee" to lend credibility to its reason. 181 And
further, that the jury would have to be instructed that if they found
the explanation to be incredible, they must find against the em-
ployer, regardless of whether or not they believe the employer had
actually discriminated. 82
Justice Scalia then turned his attention to the dissenting opinion's
173. Id.
174. Id. Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence reads:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or
by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not
shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which
remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EvID. 301. For a discussion of Rule 301, see infra notes 241-52 and accompanying text.
175. St. Mary's 113 S. Ct. at 2750-51. For a critique of Justice Scalia's hypothetical, see infra
notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
176. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2750.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2751.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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use of the language in the Court's decision in Burdine.83 Justice
Scalia noted that all of the language that the dissent quoted from
Burdine, with one exception, could be read consistent with his opin-
ion.184 First, according to Justice Scalia, the dissent misconstrued
the language in Burdine stating "the plaintiff must ...have an
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true rea-
sons, but were a pretext for discrimination." '85 Justice Scalia con-
tended that this statement does not mean as the dissent would have
it, that once the employee proves the reasons are false he wins.
Rather, the employee must show both that the reasons were false
and that discrimination was the real reason. 186
Second, Justice Scalia concentrated on the language in Burdine8 7
which stated that once the employer has met its burden of produc-
tion, "the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity." '88
He argued that this does not mean that the inquiry is reduced to
whether the employer's asserted reasons are true or false.' 89 Instead,
it "refer[s] to the fact that the inquiry-now turns from the few gen-
eralized factors that establish a prima facie case to the specific
proofs and rebuttals of discriminatory motivation the parties have
introduced."' 90
Third, Justice Scalia asserted that the sentence which states,
"[p]lacing this burden of production on the defendant thus serves
...to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pre-
text,"1 91 does not mean that the only issue is whether the employer's
reasons are false.'92 The word "pretext" is properly characterized as
"pretext for discrimination," and refers to the "form rather than the
substance of the defendant's burden: The requirement that the em-
ployer 'clearly set forth' its reasons [to give] the plaintiff a 'full and
fair' rebuttal opportunity."' 93
183. Id. (discussing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)).
184. Id. at 2753.
185. Id. at 2751-52 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
186. Id.
187. 450 U.S. 248 (1980).
188. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2752 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56).
192. Id.
193. Id. (citations omitted).
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Next, Justice Scalia addressed the language in Burdine9 4 which
states, "[the employee] now must have the opportunity to demon-
strate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the em-
ployment decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate bur-
den of persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination. 1 95 The Justice held that the proper
reading of the word "merges" was not that the employee prove that
the reasons were false, but that the proof that the employer's rea-
sons are untrue "becomes part of (and often considerably assists)
the greater enterprise of proving that the employer's real reason was
intentional discrimination."' 96
Finally, Justice Scalia quoted the statement, "[the employee] may
succeed in this [i.e., in persuading the court that she has been the
victim of intentional discrimination] either directly by persuading
the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered ex-
planation is unworthy of credence."' 97 While Justice Scalia admit-
ted that the statement's only logical explanation is that the em-
ployee's proof that the employer's reasons are false is enough to
compel judgment for the employee,1 98 he stated "that [the state-
ment] contradicts or renders inexplicable numerous other state-
ments, both in Burdine itself and in our later case-law."' 99
In its opinion, the majority attacked the dissent's proposition that
the majority's approach would' favor employers who lied about the
reasons for their actions:200 "To say that the company which in good
faith introduces such testimony, or even the testifying employee
himself, becomes a liar and a perjurer when the testimony is not
believed, is nothing short of absurd."' 20 1 The majority pointed out
that while the employer who offers a phony reason at the second
stage may be in a better position than the one who remains silent,
other procedural rules operate to uncover the truth. 02 The majority
194. 450 U.S. 248 (1980).
195. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2752 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
196. Id.
197. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2752-53.
200. Id. at 2754.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2755. The Court points to a complaint's response as one example. If the defendant
fails to respond, this results in a judgment for the plaintiff, while the defendant's deceitful re-
sponse will not. Id.
1995]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
called the dissent's approach to "judgment-for-lying" unfair and
"strangely selective. ' 20 3 According to Justice Scalia, this is espe-
cially true since the employer can lie about every other aspect of the
case such as whether the plaintiff actually applied for the job, his
length of employment, or his salary without suffering the adverse
consequence of a judgment against him. 20 4 The majority emphasized
that the employee can lie "about absolutely everything without los-
ing a verdict he otherwise deserves. '"205 Similarly,Qthe majority dis-
pelled the dissent's fear that the employee will have to peruse the
record to find and disprove the reasons that have not been articu-
lated by the employer. The majority noted that the employer's rea-
sons do not exist apart from the record but are set forth "through
the introduction of admissible evidence. ' 20 6  Finally the majority
stated:
Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot prove a
nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only against
employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by rea-
son of (in the context of the present case) race. That the employer's prof-
fered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessa-
rily establish that the plaintiff's proffered reason of race is correct. That
remains a question for the factfinder to answer .... 201
The majority found that this view was in accord with the Court's
decision in Aikens 08 and remanded the case to the lower court to
determine if enough evidence existed to find that the employer's de-
cision had been motivated by race.
In sum, the majority held that for an employee to prevail on a
claim of employment discrimination, the employee must first estab-
lish a prima facie case of discrimination.20 9 Once the prima facie
203. Id. at 2754.
204. Id. at 2754-55.
205. Id. at 2755 (emphasis in original).
206. Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)).
207. Id. at 2756.
208. 460 U.S. 711 (1983). The Court recited the following passage from Aikens,
[T]he question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and diffi-
cult. The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil Rights Act of
1964 reflect an important national policy. There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony
as to the employer's mental processes. But none of this means that trial courts or
reviewing courts should treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions
of fact. Nor should they make their inquiry even more difficult by applying legal rules
which were devised to govern "the basic allocation of burdens and order of presenta-
tion of proof" in deciding this ultimate question.
St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2756 (citations omitted).
209. Id. at 2746-47.
[Vol. 44:673
REWARDING EMPLOYERS' LIES
case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his behavior.2 10 Once the
employer has articulated some nondiscriminatory reason for his ac-
tion, the presumption of discrimination drops from the case and the
burden shifts back to the employee.2 ' At this stage, however, the
majority found that the employee could not prevail as a matter of
law on indirect proof that the employer's proffered reasons for the
negative employment action were not credible."' Instead, the Court
held that the employee must also introduce evidence that discrimi-
nation was, in fact, the true reason for the decision.213
2. The Dissent
The dissent, written by Justice Souter, attacked the majority's ap-
proach as contrary to stable and existing law by allowing the
factfinder (after the employee has proven that the employer's rea-
sons are pretextual) "to roam the record, searching for some nondis-
criminatory explanation that the defendant has not raised and that
the plaintiff has had no fair opportunity to disprove.1 14 In making
this argument, the dissent noted that establishing a prima facie case
in the context of a Title VII suit means that the employee has actu-
ally established the elements by a preponderance of the evidence. 15
By doing so, he "has eliminat[ed] the most common nondiscrimina-
tory reasons" for the employment decision.21 6 The dissent reasoned
that while it would be unfair to prohibit the employer from articu-
lating a nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, "it would be
equally unfair and utterly impractical to saddle the victims of dis-
crimination with the burden of either producing direct evidence of
discriminatory intent or eliminating the entire universe of possible
nondiscriminatory reasons for a personnel decision. '"217
Justice Souter argued that its opinion was also consistent with
Rule 301 and agreed with the majority that once the employer met
his burden, the presumption entitling the employee to judgment
210. Id. at 2747 (citing I DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL Evi-
DENCE § 67, at 536 (1977)).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2752.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981)).
216. Id. at 2758 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254) (alteration in original).
217. Id..
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dropped from the case.21 8 However, the dissent accused the majority
of neglecting the burden's other important function - to "frame
the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have
a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." 19 Justice Sou-
ter suggested that the employer is obligated "to choose the scope of
the factual issues to be resolved by the factfinder," and should be
bound by the issues it chose.220 To hold otherwise would be contrary
to the Court's policy requiring that the employer's reasons be "clear
and reasonably specific.1 221 The dissent insisted that the reasons the
employer articulates are the issues which frame the factual inquiry;
an inquiry which then "proceeds to a new level of specificity. '122
Justice Souter asserted that during this more specific inquiry, the
employer does not have to prove that its proffered reasons are true,
"rather the [employee] must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that [these] reasons are pretextual. 223 Moreover, the dissent
insisted that this interpretation of the new level of specificity re-
quirement is further supported by the passage in Burdine2 4 which
enables the employee to prove intentional discrimination via direct
evidence or indirect evidence "by showing that the employer's prof-
fered explanation is unworthy of credence. ' 225 The dissent stated
that since the court found that the employee had carried his burden
by showing that his employer's reasons were pretextual, he was enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.228
The dissent argued that the majority's approach:
fails to explain how the plaintiff. . . will ever have a 'fair and full opportu-
nity' to demonstrate that reasons not articulated by the employer, but dis-
cerned in the record by the factfinder are also unworthy of credence [and
thereby] transforms the employer's burden of production from a device used
to provide noticeand promote fairness into a misleading and potentially use-
less ritual.
227
Justice Souter also raised the concern that the majority has sent
conflicting signals regarding the scope of its decision; finding on the
218. id. at 2759 & 2759 n.2.
219. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56).
220. Id..
221. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258).
222. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255).
223. Id. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 256).
224. 450 U.S. 248 (1980).
225. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2760 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
226. Id. at 2760-61.
227. Id.
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one hand that the Court supported the notion that the discrediting
of the employer's articulated reasons would not be sufficient to sus-
tain judgment for the employee, yet stating in another passage that
such discrediting would "permit the trier of fact to infer the ulti-
mate fact of discrimination."22 In addition, the dissent referred to
the Court's decision to remand the case as "keeping Hicks's chance
of winning a judgment alive although he has done no more (in addi-
tion to proving his prima facie case) than show that the reasons
proffered by St. Mary's are unworthy of credence. 2 29
Justice Souter then focused on the inequity of allowing an em-
ployer to escape liability by lying:
There is simply no justification for favoring these employers by exempting
them from responsibility for lies. It may indeed be true that such employers
have nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions, but ones so shameful that
they wish to conceal them. One can understand human frailty and the natu-
ral desire to conceal it, however, without finding in it a justification to dis-
pense with an orderly procedure for getting at "the elusive factual question
of intentional discrimination.1
'
230
The dissent noted that to find otherwise would defeat the purpose of
Title VII as employees would decide not to sue as a result of the
uncertainties of the scheme .23  The dissent reasoned that "the ma-
jority assumes that some employers will be unable to discover the
reasons for their own personnel actions. "232 By requiring the em-
ployee to refute "any conceivable explanation for the employer's ac-
tion that might be suggested by the evidence," ' 8 this "will promote
longer trials and more pre-trial discovery, threatening increased ex-
pense and delay in Title VII litigation for both plaintiffs and de-
fendants, and increased burdens on the judiciary. '284
Finally, the dissent surmised that the majority's reliance on Aik-
ens was unfounded, finding instead that "Aikens flatly bars the
Court's conclusion here that the factfinder can choose a third expla-
nation, never offered by the employer, in ruling against the plain-
tiff."2 6 Justice Souter stated, "[w]hether Melvin Hicks wins or loses
228. Id. at 2762 (quoting the majority opinion at 2756).
229. Id.
230. Id. (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2764.
233. Id. at 2763.
234. Id,
235. Id. at 2765. The dissent noted that Aikens repeated the standard articulated in Burdine
that the plaintiff may prove pretext either with direct evidence of discrimination or via indirect
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on remand, many plaintiffs in a like position will surely lose under
the scheme adopted by the Court today, unless they possess both
prescience and resources beyond what this Court has previously re-
quired Title VII litigants to employ. '286
In sum, the dissent agrees with the majority that once the defend-
ant articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the pre-
sumption of discrimination established by the prima facie "drops
from the case. ' 37 However, the dissent disagrees with the majority
about the proper disposition of the case when the employee then
offers proof that the employer's proffered reasons are without
credence. 3 8 The dissent believes that when the employee has shown
that the employer's reasons at the second stage are fallible, the em-
ployee should not be required to produce either direct evidence of
discriminatory intent or eliminate all possible nondiscriminatory
reasons for an employment decision. 3 9 Instead, the dissent believes
that once the employer's proffered reasons are discredited, the em-
ployee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2 40
IIV. ANALYSIS
A. Rule 301
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia relies on Federal Rule of
Evidence 301241 to justify allocating the burden of proof in the man-
ner used in the McDonnell Douglas case. Justice Scalia supports the
view that once the employer-defendant has proffered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decision at issue -
thereby meeting his burden of production - the presumption of dis-
crimination "drops from the case. '24 2 Justice Scalia considers this
view consistent with the way other presumptions operate in the
law.243
evidence making the employer's reasons unbelievable. Id. The dissent also noted in Aikens that
the statement which directs the court to "decide which party's explanation ... it believes" upon
which the majority relied, supports its holding as well, "[b]y requiring the factfinder to choose
between the employer's explanation and the plaintiff's claim of discrimination (shown either di-
rectly or indirectly)." Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
236. Id. at 2766.
237. Id. at 2759 (citations omitted).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2758.
240. Id. at 2760-61.
241. For the text of Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see supra note 174.
242. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1980).
243. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2755.
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Although Title VII litigation is subject to the same procedural
rules as other civil litigation,244 as well as Rule 301, the precise ap-
plication of Rule 301 has long been debated, even at the time Con-
gress adopted the Rule.246 There are two views through which the
presumption of discrimination may be viewed - the Thayer-Wig-
more rule and the Morgan-McCormick rule.246 Under the Thayer-
Wigmore rule, the presumption is used as a matter of procedural
convenience and "operates only in the absence of evidence offered to
rebut the presumed fact. 247 Once the presumption is rebutted, how-
ever, it vanishes - hence, it is characterized as the "bursting bub-
ble" theory.248 The Morgan-McCormick rule, on the other hand, as-
serts that presumptions were created for reasons of policy and
should permanently alter the burden of persuasion.24 9 Under the
Morgan-McCormick rule, the ultimate burden of persuasion never
shifts. Instead, the intermediate burden (the one at the second
stage) shifts, and "each party's satisfaction of these intermediate
burdens determines who prevails. 25 0 While Rule 301 has generally
been interpreted to follow the bursting-bubble theory articulated by
Thayer-Wigmore, 26 1 at least one commentator has suggested that it
operates as more of a hybrid of the two rules. 52
Although it appears that Justice Scalia's approach to burden allo-
cation in discrimination cases is technically correct, it may not be
morally sound. It is questionable whether the operation of this pre-
sumption would further the purpose of the Civil Rights Act. Under
Justice Scalia's approach, the "shifting" ceases after the employer
has articulated some reason for his actions and the plaintiff must
then prove the employer's actions were a pretext for intentional dis-
244. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (describing the
burden as one that follows the usual method of federal courts).
245. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Comment, The Effect of Presumptions on Motions for Sum-
mary Judgment in Federal Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1110-13 (1984) (describing the vari-
ous views about the application of Rule 301 presumption).
246. Id. at 1107 (citing 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5122 (1977)).
247. Id. at 1108.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1109.
250. Raymond Nardo, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks Burst Bubble in Employment Dis-
crimination, N.Y. L.J.. Aug. 9, 1993, at 1, 4 (citation omitted).
251. Smith, supra 245, at 1110.
252. Id. (describing Rule 301 as a hybrid rule that "probably has more in common with the
Thayer-Wigmore rule than the Morgan-McCormick rule").
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crimination. " Given that discrediting the employer's proffered rea-
sons are not enough, the plaintiff is stuck in the position in which he
had begun the case." 4
While the employer's burden of production rebuts the mandatory
presumption, it does not mean that the evidence of the prima facie
case is without probative value." At least one commentator has
suggested that even after the defendant has articulated some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason, "[i]t would be more consistent with
Title VII to give the presumption some weight in helping the plain-
tiff to meet her burden of persuasion. "256 Justice Scalia points out
that the factfinder is free to infer from that evidence that the em-
ployer did discriminate, but the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. 57 His interpretation, however, undermines his
unwillingness to allow proof of discrimination by "indirect evidence"
to be a sufficient basis upon which a defendant can prevail and con-
tradicts the Court's own recognition that there will seldom be direct
evidence of intentional discrimination. "58
B. Rewarding Employers' Lies
Adoption of this type of rule arguably gives the employer a strong
incentive to lie.25 9 In fact, as the dissent points out, this allocation of
burdens actually rewards the employer for lying and places the
plaintiff in a significantly weaker position than when he started.26 0
As one commentator noted, "[i]t need not matter whether these rea-
sons actually motivated the employer, or whether they are accurate;
253. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text (describing the approach Justice Scalia
advocates).
254. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's view that Rule
301 mandates that the plaintiff do more than show the defendant's reasons are untrue to prevail in
a discrimination claim).
255. See, e.g., Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 254 (lst Cir. 1986) (ex-
plaining the probative value of the evidence used to create a presumption).
256. Smalls, supra note 22, at 266.
257. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993), vacated, 2 F.3d 264 (8th
Cir. 1993); see also Brief of Washington Legal Foundation and the Equal Opportunity Founda-
tion as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993) (No. 92-602), available in Lexis, Genfed Library, Briefs File (stating that "there may be
some cases where the plaintiff's initial evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of the
defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant's explanation").
258. "There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes."
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
259. See Lanctot, supra note 38, at 105 ("[T]he truth of defendant's evidence is irrelevant to
whether defendant has met its burden of rebutting a presumption.").
260. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2764.
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simply by offering them, the defendant-employer avoids a compelled
judgment against him. 281
Although Justice Scalia is offended by the dissent's reference to
employers whose proffered reasons are disbelieved as "liars, 2 62 the
hypothetical that he proposes to defend his position is equally repre-
hensible. 8 Justice Scalia is willing to forego granting judgment to a
plaintiff who has proven that the defendant's articulated reasons are
not credible, for the chance that the only person who knows any-
thing about the employment decision which is the subject of the liti-
gation has since been fired from his position. 64 He fears that the
former employee, who is now openly hostile toward his employer,
would lie about the reasons for the decision thereby forcing the em-
ployer to articulate some other legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for its action which may not be based in fact.26
First, no evidence is presented to show the likelihood of the occur-
rence of the situation described in the hypothetical and it is unlikely
that it is not very high. Second, Justice Scalia appears to operate
under the assumption that the employer is somehow barred from
presenting evidence that it is relying on a disgruntled former em-
ployee for help in sustaining its burden at the second stage, and that
a judge is somehow incapable of taking this evidence into considera-
tion when making his judgment. The small number of cases repre-
sented by Justice Scalia's hypothetical should not be used to create
a blanket rule eliminating the plaintiff's chance to win a grant of
summary judgment and forcing him to incur the costs of further
litigation.
Further, Justice Scalia posits that the employer would be barred
from presenting statistics showing that the employer's minority work
force far exceeds the percent of minorities in the relevant labor mar-
ket or that the hiring officer making the decision was a member of
the same minority group. 66 Justice Scalia offers no explanation in
support of this conclusion. If the employer denies having discrimi-
nated against the employee (an option which is always available to
261. Nardo, supra note 250, at 4.
262. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2754 (stating "there is no justification for assuming (as the
dissent repeatedly does) that those employers whose evidence is disbelieved are perjurers and
liars").
263. See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text (describing the hypothetical).
264. See supra note 180-82 and accompanying text (stating Justice Scalia's view).
265. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2751.
266. Id.
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the employer as a defense), this evidence would be relevant and
could be entered into the record by the employer.2 67 Interestingly,
Justice Scalia seems willing to allow the employer to present statis-
tics to prove that it did not intentionally discriminate, while he is
seemingly unwilling to allow the employee to prevail on such "indi-
rect evidence" were it to favor a finding of discrimination.2 6 8
As the dissent properly notes, Justice Scalia assumes that employ-
ers do not keep employment records and will not know how it ar-
rived at the decision it made.2 69 Good business practice would dic-
tate that an employer keep a record on each employee and
document the reasons for any adverse employment decisions, such as
firings, in order to insulate itself from liability. Justice Scalia's ra-
tionale serves as a disincentive to keep accurate records and encour-
ages compartmentalizing of information regarding employment de-
cisions as the employee is forced to prove not only that the employer
was not motivated by the reasons he proffered, but also that he was
not motivated by some other reason "in the record." Even in the
hiring context, the employer, while it may not keep a list of those
applying for the job, must have some basic qualifications it looks for
in an applicant and some idea as to why the person who was passed
over was not hired (i.e., the other person was better qualified, has
more experience, or has better interpersonal skills). Justice Scalia
refuses to place the burden on the employer to even articulate all
the possible reasons for its decision. Nevertheless, he is comfortable
with placing the onerous burden on the plaintiff to ascertain from
the record what reasons the employer had for making the decision,
to prove both that the reasons proffered by the employer and those
obtained from the record were not the factors used in the employ-
ment context, and further to prove that discrimination was the em-
ployer's underlying motive. 7
C. Failure to Allow Proof of Discrimination by Indirect
Evidence
If the majority's opinion is wholeheartedly adopted, the allocation
267. Lamber, et al. supra note 20.
268. See supra notes 173-74, 266 and accompanying text (describing Justice Scalia's opinion
that rejection of the employer's reasons does not compel judgment for the employee, and his con-
cern that under the dissent's view, the employer would be barred from preventing favorable
statistics).
269. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2764.
270. Id. at 2747-50.
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of the burdens does not operate logically. The employee relies on the
prima facie case to create a presumption of discrimination for the
very reason that he does not have direct evidence of discrimina-
tion.27' If, in fact, the employee has direct evidence, the three stage
evidentiary triumvirate of McDonnell Douglas is not needed. The
employee who presents direct evidence of discrimination in the first
instance shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that he did not
discriminate .1 7  Thus, the plaintiff's two different allocations, one
creating a presumption and the second submitting direct evidence of
discrimination, collapse. Regardless of which path the employee
chooses, absent direct evidence of discriminatory motive, not only is
summary judgment unobtainable, but the employee's case will ulti-
mately fail. Accordingly, it becomes important to determine what is
considered "plus" or "direct" evidence of discriminatory motive.
D. What is "Plus" Evidence?
In considering what would be enough evidence for the finding of
discrimination, it is important to note that the Supreme Court is
well aware that there is rarely eyewitness evidence of discrimina-
tion.274 Undoubtedly that is the precise reason why the Supreme
Court created the triumvirate evidentiary stages in its opinions in
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. The necessity of relying on cir-
cumstantial or indirect evidence is due to the employee's inability to
get inside the decision-maker's mind to determine what his intent is
in making employment decisions. It is no surprise to find Justice
Scalia authoring the majority's opinion in light of his dissent in
Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd.2 5 when he was a circuit judge. In
Carter, an African-American employee in a small company brought
271. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that the purposes of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case requirement is to compen-
sate for the "fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by").
272. See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (stating that when the
plaintiff uses direct evidence of discrimination, he need not rely on the McDonnell Douglas alloca-
tion of proof).
273. See Robert S. Whitman, Note, Clearing the Mixed Motive Smokescreen: An Approach to
Disparate Treatment Under Title VI11 87 MICH. L. REV. 863, 883 n. 110 (1989) ("The plaintiff's
proof by means of direct evidence does not merely fulfill his burden of showing a prima facie case;
it suffices to make his entire case and throws the burden on the defendant of proving, at least by a
preponderance of the evidence, that it would have rejected the plaintiff even in the absence of
discrimination.") (citation omitted).
274. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
275. 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see supra note 132 (discussing Justice Scalia's dissent in
the Carter case).
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an action against her employer alleging that she was discriminated
against on the basis of her race. 278 At trial, the employee presented
evidence that she had been repeatedly treated differently than the
white employees. 2 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's
decision for the plaintiff employee finding that she "introduced suffi-
cient evidence from which the jury could have deduced discrimina-
tion. 278 In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's re-
liance on evidence of differential treatment to prove racial
motivation was unwarranted.27 9  He stated, "[d]efendant's work
force is too small to make any statistical analysis of the treatment of
black and white employees useful in deciding whether it purpose-
fully discriminated against plaintiff because she was black."28 Jus-
tice Scalia went on to add that without this evidence there "was no
evidence of racial motivation . . . except for the plainly inadequate
instance of the racial slur." 8' The Justice believed that the em-
ployer should have been granted a directed verdict in the case stat-
ing, "it is difficult to imagine any small business hiring a minority
employee which does not, in doing so, commit its economic welfare
and its good name to the unpredictable speculations of some yet un-
named jury. 282
Based on Justice Scalia's dissent in Carter, the employee in a
small business firm who is repeatedly treated differently would not
be able to make out a case of intentional discrimination simply be-
cause he cannot provide the court with statistical evidence to sup-
port his case. 28 Absent direct evidence of discrimination, the small
business owner appears to have immunity from Title VII simply due
to its size and despite the fact that Title VII applies to all employers
with fifteen employees or more.28 A question remains as to whether
276. Carter, 727 F.2d at 1228.
277. The plaintiff was the only African-American employee in the firm. Id. The evidence of
differential treatment included the seclusion of the plaintiff to one end of the company's show-
room, her supervisor's instructions that she should not answer the phone, her salary was the lowest
and her bonuses were the fewest of the employees, and a supervisor made a racially derogatory
remark in her presence. Id. at 1228-30. There was also testimony that the plaintiff was treated
unequally in access to staff meetings, to a parking space, and to the actual facility. Id. at 1230.
278. Id. at 1235.
279. Id. at 1245-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the evidence of differential
treatment the plaintiff had presented, see supra note 277.
280. Carter, 727 F.2d at 1246.
281. Id. (emphasis in original).
282. Id. at 1247.
283. Id. at 1246.
284. Section 701(b) of the Civil Rights Act provides in the relevant part: "For the purposes of
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or not, in Justice Scalia's opinion, any statistical evidence would
have been enough given that the other "indirect" evidence of racial
bias (the racially derogatory remark) was "plainly inadequate." '85
The use of statistics as evidence of discriminatory motive in dispa-
rate treatment cases has been a serious topic of debate. 86 In Mc-
Donnell Douglas, the Supreme Court hinted that the use of statis-
tics would significantly help the plaintiff in establishing pretext.287
Statistics are relevant in the context of disparate treatment in that
they may show a pattern of differential treatment of minority group
members to support the inference that the employer discriminated
against the individual on the basis of his group membership.2 88
However, commentators have suggested that the courts should be
leery of statistical showings and be "more demanding in the sophis-
tication required of plaintiffs' statistical showings. '"289 For example,
one commentator noted that "[t]he plaintiff seeking to employ sta-
tistical analysis must demonstrate that all or substantially all of the
factors that contribute to [the employer's decision] are taken into
account in the statistical model. 2 90
Because statistical evidence may be unobtainable, the employee
may turn to other information to infer discriminatory motive.2 91 In
this subchapter -
(b) The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1991).
285. Carter, 727 F.2d at 1246 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
286. For a discussion of the various views regarding the use of statistics in both disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment cases, see supra note 20.
287. For a discussion of the Court's holding in McDonnell Douglas, see supra notes 37-45 and
accompanying text.
288. Lamber, et al. supra note 20, at 570.
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative . . . because such imbal-
ance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordi-
narily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a
workforce more or less representative of the . . . population in the community from
which employees are hired. Evidence of longlasting and gross disparity between the
composition of the work force and that of the general population thus may be signifi-
cant ....
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977), cited in, Sulli-
van, supra note 21, at 1113.
289. Browne, supra note 38, at 541.
290. Id. at 555.
291. The unavailability of statistical evidence may be due to the small minority representation
within a company, or to the necessity that the employee take into account all of the factors in the
employer's decision. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1114 ("Small employers with little em-
ployee turnover, for example, may not exhibit a 'statistically significant' proportion of white em-
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Williams v. Valentec Kisco,1" for example, the employee sought to
prove that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his age
in the employer's decision to terminate him. The jury found for
the employee and the employer asked the lower court to enter a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict." The lower court refused
and the employer appealed.29 In that case, the employee had re-
cently returned from a medical leave of absence because of work-
related injuries and prostate surgery. 2" He requested a transfer to
the second shift so that he could perform his regular job. 9 How-
ever, he asked to transfer back to the third shift when his supervisor
told him that the only job available at the second shift would re-
quire heavy lifting, which was difficult due to his medical condi-
tion. 2"8 The supervisor told the plaintiff that he had to work the sec-
ond shift anyway. 9 9 While at work, the supervisor moved a skid of
boxes and would not allow him to use a dolly to retrieve them.300
The supervisor then accused him of refusing to do his job.30 1 His
employment was eventually terminated. 0
At trial, the employer's reason for firing the employee was due to
his failure to obey the orders of his supervisor.303 The appellate
court held however, that although the case is close, "[tihe evidence
certainly supports a conclusion that the supervisor . . . was arbi-
trary in moving the skid and in forbidding [the plaintiff] from using
the dolly to move the boxes. 304 In addition to discrediting the em-
ployer's proffered reason for the decision, the employee presented
evidence of a derogatory remark about age made by another super-
ployees for many years, even if hiring uniformly favors whites over blacks."); Lamber, supra note
20, at 582-83 (noting that upon doing statistical analysis, an employee should "attempt to rule out
all plausible alternatives," but that it is difficult when "subjective judgment or discretion by the
decisionmaker is permissible").
292. 964 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1992). For a further discussion of the Williams case, see supra
notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
293. Id. at 725.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 726.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 727.
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visor.305 The Eighth Circuit held that although the employee did not
"submit a direct evidence theory," this remark was direct evidence
of discriminatory intent and could be an independent basis upon
which the jury could have found pretext.30
At first glance, the Eighth Circuit's decision gives the employee
some hope. This hope, however, may be unwarranted. Given that
most discrimination is not overt, the chances of an employee having
evidence of derogatory comments seems slim. While the Eighth Cir-
cuit found that a derogatory remark directed at a protected class
was enough to establish pretext for discrimination, the Eighth Cir-
cuit admitted in its opinion that it was operating under a pretext-
only theory;0 7 the theory which was rejected in St. Mary's.308 Simi-
larly, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Carter is evidence that
he would not find one derogatory remark sufficient to establish dis-
criminatory motive30 9 and would probably overturn the jury's ver-
dict for that reason. Thus, while attempting to eliminate confusion
regarding the allocation of proof in discrimination cases, the deci-
sion in St. Mary's creates confusion over the requisite amount of
proof sufficient for an employee to show "direct" evidence of dis-
criminatory intent.
The question of what constitutes "sufficient" proof is presumably
left open for the lower courts to resolve and will be fashioned as jury
verdicts are appealed and either overturned or upheld. While Justice
Scalia appears receptive to the fact that an ex-employee may be-
come hostile to his former employer, and refuse to testify on the
employer's behalf,3 10 he does not seem sympathetic to the employee
who must come forward with some evidence such as the testimony
of other co-employees regarding the employer's alleged wrongdoing.
It is not rational to assume that employees, especially those who
have few alternate employment opportunities, will be ready and
willing to testify against their employer. Thus, even where there has
been overt discriminatory conduct on the part of the employer, the
305. Id. at 728. The remark, which was made to the plaintiff's supervisor, questioned what the
supervisor was doing "with an old man carrying the boxes anyway?" Id.
306. Id.
307. See id. (rejecting the pretext-plus theory).
308. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747-50 (1993), vacated, 2 F.3d 264
(8th Cir. 1993).
309. See supra notes 132, 279-82 (discussing Justice Scalia's dissent in the Carter case).
310. For a description of the factual scenario from which Justice Scalia posits this hypothetical,
see supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
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employee may face considerable obstacles to getting the evidence on
court record.
In light of the difficulty in securing "direct" evidence of discrimi-
nation, the potential exists for the inquiry into the employer's intent
to amount to little more than the meaningless recitation of a legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reason. This empty charade becomes an
easily surmountable formality and is analogous to the practical ef-
fect of the approach adopted in the context of discrimination in the
use of peremptory challenges in jury selection. For example, in the
seminal case of Batson v. Kentuckya" the Supreme Court held that
the defendant can establish a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion by showing:
[first,] that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prose-
cutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire mem-
bers of the defendant's race, [second,] the defendant is entitled to rely on
the fact . . . that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice
that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate, [and
third,] the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant cir-
cumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used the challenges to ex-
clude the veniremen from the . . . jury on account of their race. " "
However, after the defendant has established his case, the prosecu-
tor must merely come forward with a neutral explanation for his
actions in order to sustain his use of a peremptory challenge to ex-
clude the minority veniremen.3 's Just as the clever prosecutor will
undoubtedly be able to articulate a neutral nondiscriminatory rea-
son for eliminating an African-American juror from the jury panel,
so will the well-advised employer be able to articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for his adverse employment decision. 1
V. IMPACT
The majority's decision in St. Mary's will have the effect of de-
creasing the number of suits filed against employers as employees
will be unwilling to pay for litigation when the nature and amount
311. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
312. Id. at 96.
313. Id. at 97.
314. Throughout its decision in Batson, the Court notes that the evidentiary burden used in its
decisions concerning disparate treatment in the employment discrimination context is analogous to
the evidentiary burden established in Batson. For example, the Court states, "[o]ur decisions con-
cerning 'disparate treatment' under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have explained the
operation of prima facie burden of proof rules." Id. at 94 n.1 8.
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of evidence that is necessary to prevail is uncertain.3 15 Those who
opt to bring a case and do not have direct evidence of discrimination
will undoubtedly have their case submitted to the jury for resolu-
tion,3 16 resulting in higher costs, unpredictabity of outcome, and a
greater consumption of judicial resources. This is a burden for em-
ployee and employer alike. Employers are concerned that their mo-
tive, although not discriminatory, will be interpreted so by juries,
"which tend to be less legalistic than judges in trials, [and] may
presume that a lying employer is also a discriminating employer.",
As a result of this fear, there will be more litigation at the appellate
level as courts will feel the need "to reverse juries unless the record
contains direct evidence of discrimination." 8"
On the other hand, some argue that it is necessary that the em-
ployee establish intent.31 9 These critics are unwilling to force the
employer to incur the costs of compliance with Title VII where the
employee cannot establish discrimination through direct evidence.3 20
"A decision permitting imposition of liability, even in the absence of
proof of forbidden discrimination, would raise the business commu-
nity's costs of civil rights compliance to unacceptably high levels. ' 21
Thus, under this view, the decision in St. Mary's serves to eliminate
frivolous claims and to allow the employer to exercise vast manage-
rial discretion in employment decisions. While these may be sincere
and legitimate goals, they do not come without a cost; the cost that
the employee against whom discrimination has occurred will forego
his right to sue under Title VII, thereby licensing the employer to
continue to discriminate.
The economic balance of the parties in an employment situation
is what is ultimately at stake. To maintain the integrity of Title VII,
315. Joseph M. Sellers of the Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights stated, "[tihe
evidence of discrimination is often subtle, and while it is hard to say how it will affect individuals,
it will apply to an enormous number of cases." Joan Biskupic, High Court Erects New Barrier to
Job Bias Suits; Employees Required to Furnish Direct Evidence of Discrimination, Which Can
Be Hard to Do, THE WASH. POST, June 26, 1993, at A4.
316. See, e.g., Nardo, supra note 250, at I (stating that "the practical effect will be that cases
involving indirect proof of discrimination will now be submitted to juries, who can lawfully find
that the employer's proffered reason for the adverse action was a lie but, nonetheless, the employer
did not discriminate"). Section 102 of The Civil Rights Act of 1991 extended the privilege of jury
trials to Title VII claims. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(c) (West Supp. 1994).
317. Biskupic, supra note 315.
318. Id.
319. See, e.g., Samp, supra note 6 (supporting this viewpoint).
320. Id.
321. Id.
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we must be willing to place the cost upon the employer to document
his managerial decisions, make him articulate those reasons which
motivated those decisions, and 'then hold him accountable if those
reasons are discredited. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court is not
willing to make the employer bear that cost. The Court is not un-
comfortable with the employer contriving reasons for its decisions
and it will force the employer to endure the ritual of articulating
some reason which motivated its decision. 22 But, it will not hold the
employer accountable unless the employee can not only discredit
both the proffered reasons and others found in the record but also
present evidence of a discriminatory motivation.32 s Thus, the burden
placed upon the employee increases, the depth of discovery in-
creases, and the cost in litigation increases. The employee is forced
to discern what is in the depths of the employer's mind in hopes of
securing direct evidence of discriminatory intent. As there is little
guidance regarding the definition of direct evidence, the quantity
and quality necessary will have to be worked out in the circuits and
there is little doubt that absent Congressional action, the Supreme
Court will have to contend with the issue of intentional discrimina-
tion again.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in St. Mary's makes intentional discrimination
harder for the employee to prove. The employee must not only dis-
credit all the employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons that it
has proffered, he must go beyond that and discredit other reasons
that may have motivated the employer. He must then offer indepen-
dent evidence showing that discrimination was the real reason for
the employer's decision. This burden significantly undermines the
purpose of the Civil Rights Act and blatantly ignores the difficulty
in finding direct evidence of discrimination. As a result, suing the
employer will become more costly, more time consuming, and the
likelihood of prevailing will remain nebulous at best.
Kristen T. Saam
322. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (stating that in St. Mary's, the Court ac-
knowledged that the employer who offers a phony reason at the second stage may be in a better
position than the one who does not offer any reason).
323. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text (stating that according to the St. Mary's
decision, the plaintiff must not only show that the employer's reasons are false, but also that the
employer intentionally discriminated).
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